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The purpose of this column is to provide an overview of so-
cial cognition in schizophrenia. The column begins with
a short introduction to social cognition. Then, we describe
the application of social cognition to the study of schizo-
phrenia, with an emphasis on key domains (i.e., emotion
perception, Theory of Mind, and attributional style). We
conclude the column by discussing the relationship of social
cognition to neurocognition, negative symptoms, and func-
tioning, with an eye toward strategies for improving social
cognition in schizophrenia.
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What Is Social Cognition?
Social cognition refers to how people think about them-
selves and others in the social world. The term originated
within social psychology during the general ‘‘cognitive
revolution’’
1 of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The social
cognition construct provides a broad theoretical perspec-
tive that focuses on how people process information
within social contexts. It includes person perception,
causal attributions concerning self and others, and bring-
ing social judgments to decision making, among other
elements.
2–5
Social cognition research shares 4 common features.
3
The first is an unabashed mentalism, a focus on mental
representations such as ‘‘schemas.’’ These are organized
sets of ideas, such as a person’s conceptualization of one-
self, attitudes toward racial groups, or notions about the
physical properties of the external world. Once schemas
are activated and accessible, they have far-reaching con-
sequences, such as when inferring whether someone is
friendly orwhen deciding whether tocontinue aromantic
relationship.
Researchers have also shown that ‘‘metacognitive’’
experiences are critical to people’s mental representa-
tions.
6 These are subjective experiences that accompany
schemas, such as the ease or difficulty of recall or associ-
ation. For example, if one attempts to retrieve examples
supporting another’s trustworthiness but finds this sub-
jectively difficult to accomplish, one may instead infer
that the other is untrustworthy. Reliance on metacogni-
tive experience for making judgments is heightened
under conditions of relatively limited cognitive resources
(eg, distraction, load, or working memory deficits)
7 that
are common in schizophrenia. Thus, this process has
paradoxical implications for the common technique of
‘‘generating alternatives’’ used in cognitive therapy for
psychosis. For example, an individual may report that
he saw a black car in front of his house and is therefore
certain that the Central Intelligence Agency is after him.
This will lead the therapist to suggest that the individual
thinkofotherpossiblereasonswhythecarmaybeparked
there. However, cognitive deficits may make this such an
effortfulprocessfortheindividualthat,evenifhecangen-
erate other possibilities, he may conclude that the belief
must be true (because the other reasons do not readily
cometomind),furtherentrenchinghisdelusion.Thus,re-
searchonmetacognitionsuggeststhatcliniciansmayneed
to strike a balance between asking them to think flexibly
about situations but not to the extent that the process
becomes effortful, aversive, and countertherapeutic.
A second common feature is that social cognition is
process oriented. Researchers attempt to understand
the precise causal mechanisms intervening between initial
interactions with stimulus persons and product behav-
iors. For example, upon being asked for money by a pan-
handler,aperson’sresponsemaydiffergreatlydepending
onwhetheraninterveningattributionengenderedannoy-
ance or sympathy. Social cognition researchers have used
increasingly sophisticated referential methods ranging
from reaction timing to brain imaging to assess interven-
ingprocesses.
8Forexample,becauseofpotentiallimitsto
insight or honesty, social cognition researchers have de-
veloped a variety of ‘‘implicit’’ measures involving reac-
tiontimingtoexaminetheautomaticassociationbetween
attitudes and behaviors.
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408Third, social cognition is characterized by interdisci-
plinary approaches and cross-fertilization of ideas. Not
only is there an obviousmelding of social with traditional
cognitive psychology but also a melding with other fields
such as developmental psychology, clinical psychology,
and neuroscience. For example, neuroscientific ap-
proaches have found that specific brain regions are acti-
vated in response to social decision making. These
regions, like the striatum, which are active for basic
rewards, also appear to encode more abstract social
rewards such as positive feelings produced by mutual co-
operation,
10 commonalities that would not have been un-
covered without an interdisciplinary approach.
Finally, social cognition researchers are concerned
with real-world applications. One interesting example is
that social cognition research has been used to enlighten
legal decisions of the US Supreme Court.
11 Researchers
have been called as expert witnesses to testify to the an-
tecedent conditions, indicators, consequences, and rem-
edies of stereotyping. This has influenced decisions
about prejudice and discrimination cases ranging from
trials and appeals courts to the Supreme Court’s reviews.
Social Cognition in Schizophrenia
What do we know about social cognition in schizophre-
nia? There appear to be 3 primary domains of inquiry:
emotionperception,TheoryofMind(ToM),andattribu-
tional style. In regard to emotion perception (eg, identi-
fying emotion displayed in various facial expressions or
tone of voice), the following conclusions can be drawn
(reviewed by Edwards et al
12, Hellewell and Whittaker
13,
Kohler and Brennan
14, and Mandal et al
15). First, indi-
viduals with schizophrenia display deficits compared
with nonclinical control participants. Second, these def-
icits are more severe relative to individuals with other
psychiatric disorders such as depressive disorder (unless
psychotic features are present). Third, the greatest defi-
cits are evident in the perception of negative emotions
(compared with positive emotions). Fourth, the deficit
in emotion perception is stable over time, although evi-
dence suggests that individuals in remission may outper-
form individuals in an acute phase of the disorder. Fifth,
individuals with schizophrenia perform worse trying to
‘‘read between the lines’’ (ie, identifying what a given in-
dividual is thinking or feeling) but are less impaired on
more concrete social judgments (ie, identifying what
a person is wearing or doing). Sixth, many individuals
with schizophrenia display restricted visual scanning
and spend less time examining salient facial features dur-
ing emotion perception tasks.
16,17 Finally, impairments
in emotion perception are present early in the course
of illness.
18–20
ToM refers to the ability to represent human mental
states and/or to make inferences about another’s inten-
tions. It includes understanding false beliefs, hints, inten-
tions, deception, metaphor, irony, and faux pas. Over 30
studies have been conducted on ToM in schizophrenia,
leading to the following conclusions (reviewed in Brune
21
and Harrington et al
22). In general, individuals with
schizophrenia exhibit deficits in ToM relative to nonill
and psychiatric controls. The bulk of research supports
the conclusion that this impairment in schizophrenia is
a trait deficit. First-degree relatives of individuals with
schizophreniawhoalsoscorehighonschizotypyhaveim-
paired ToM,
23 lending support for ToM as a potential
endophenotype for schizophrenia. ToM deficits are pres-
ent in both inpatient and outpatient samples, are not
accountedforbydeficits ingeneralcognitivefunctioning,
and are not uniquely associated with any specific symp-
tom type (eg, paranoia). The etiology of ToM deficits
in schizophrenia remains unclear, in part because the
genesis of normal ToM is still unknown (eg, Leslie
24
and Harris
25).
Attributional style refers to explanations people gener-
ate regarding the causes of positive and negative events in
their lives. Normally, people attribute responsibility
for positive events to themselves and responsibility
for negative events to others. The majority of work in
schizophrenia has focused on attributional style in indi-
viduals with paranoia or persecutory delusions. Such
individuals tend to blame others rather than situations
for negative events, an attributional style known as a
‘‘personalizing bias.’’
26,27 This becomes a dynamic mech-
anism for regulating self-esteem because attributing neg-
ative intentions to others maintains a positive self-image.
However, it comes at the cost of increasingly negative
perceptions of others. Such negative attributions to
others are not corrected in paranoia, even when one
obtains subsequent disconfirming information about
the other’s culpability. According to Bentall et al,
26 2 fac-
tors prevent individuals with persecutory delusions from
correcting their bias in the face of disconfirming situa-
tional information: a strong need for closure (ie, an intol-
erance of ambiguity) and impairments in ToM. Indeed,
preliminary research shows an association between need
for closure and persecutory delusions
28 and between def-
icits in ToM and personalizing attributions.
29,30 Individ-
uals with persecutory delusions may of course have other
social cognitive biases such as the tendency to ‘‘jump to
conclusions’’ and to demonstrate a ‘‘confirmation bias’’
(ie, seeking confirmatory evidence for a belief rather than
disconfirmatory evidence; reviewed in Freeman
31). In all,
a variety of social cognitive deficits and biases may un-
derlie paranoia.
RelationshipofSocialCognitiontoCognitionandNegative
Symptoms
How does social cognition relate to other domains, most
notably neurocognition (eg, attention, memory, execu-
tive function) and negative symptoms?
32 Conceptually,
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cognitive processing, whereas neurocognitive processing
is relatively affect-neutral.
33–35 In contrast, negative
symptoms could spring from a similar affective process-
ing dysfunction as social cognitive impairments. For ex-
ample, diminished social reward salience found in
negative symptoms (eg, anhedonia and amotivation)
may contribute to subtypes of social cognitive dysfunc-
tion.
36 Alternatively, failed empathy or mental simula-
tion of others’ cognitive-affect states (a putatively
social cognitive phenomenon)
37–40 may underlie ToM
deficits and also foster the extinction of social reinforce-
ment, leading to increased negative symptoms.
Empirically, studies using statistical modeling techni-
ques
36,41 and matched task designs
42,43 have concluded
that social cognition is best understood as related to,
but distinct from, neurocognition and negative symp-
toms. This distinction is also observed at the neural level
because activation circuitry for social cognition vis-a-vis
neurocognition and negative symptoms are relatively in-
dependent.
33,44,45
Treatment Implications
Recent enthusiasm for social cognition in schizophrenia
hasfolloweduponresearchshowingthatithasarelation-
ship with functional outcomes (eg, social skills, commu-
nity functioning).
46,47 This, in turn, has inspired
researchers to examine whether social cognition can be
improved (reviewed by Horan et al
48) because social cog-
nition may be an important target for pharmacological
and psychosocial treatments. Interestingly, there has
beenlittle support foratypicalmedicationsimprovingso-
cial cognition in schizophrenia because the one large ad-
equately powered study
49 found that neither quetiapine
nor risperidone resulted in improved emotion perception
among 289 individuals with schizophrenia. Thus, there
has been growing interest in psychosocial treatments as
a means of improving social cognition.
Psychosocial treatment programs use a variety of tech-
niques to ameliorate social cognitive deficits, from ‘‘tar-
geted’’ interventions that focus on a specific skill (eg,
asking clients to imitate others’ facial expressions to im-
proveemotionperception)tothosethattargetintegrative
social cognitive abilities via viewing videotapes and
role-playing. While there is growing evidence that social
cognition can be improved,
48 future research needs to
determine whether improvements in social cognition
generalize to other social cognitive domains as well as
to behaviors. Initial data from our own laboratory on
the Social Cognition and Interaction Training program
suggest that targeting social cognition may result in
changes in real-world behavior,
50 although these findings
are preliminary and in need of replication.
It might be the case that social cognition training can-
not be done in isolation but must be linked with broader
based skills training in a manner consistent with the most
effective cognitive remediation studies (reviewed in
McGurk et al
51). Thus, one can imagine tailoring treat-
ment (cognitive remediation, social cognitive training,
cognitive behavioral therapy, etc.) to the needs of the cli-
ent with schizophrenia, rather than hoping that a ‘‘one-
size intervention’’ will fit all, an unrealistic expectation
given the heterogeneity of the disorder (and its changes
over time). Clearly, however, social cognition training
has promise as an addition to the armamentarium of
the treatments for schizophrenia.
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